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ABSTRACT
The Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) and its
distributed version have been widely used in machine learning. In
the iterations of ADMM, model updates using local private data and
model exchanges among agents impose critical privacy concerns.
Despite some pioneering works to relieve such concerns, differen-
tially private ADMM still confronts many research challenges. For
example, the guarantee of differential privacy (DP) relies on the
premise that the optimality of each local problem can be perfectly
attained in each ADMM iteration, which may never happen in prac-
tice. The model trained by DP ADMM may have low prediction
accuracy. In this paper, we address these concerns by proposing
a novel (Improved) Plausible differentially Private ADMM algo-
rithm, called PP-ADMM and IPP-ADMM. In PP-ADMM, each agent
approximately solves a perturbed optimization problem that is for-
mulated from its local private data in an iteration, and then perturbs
the approximate solution with Gaussian noise to provide the DP
guarantee. To further improve the model accuracy and convergence,
an improved version IPP-ADMM adopts sparse vector technique
(SVT) to determine if an agent should update its neighbors with the
current perturbed solution. The agent calculates the difference of
the current solution from that in the last iteration, and if the differ-
ence is larger than a threshold, it passes the solution to neighbors; or
otherwise the solution will be discarded. Moreover, we propose to
track the total privacy loss under the zero-concentrated DP (zCDP)
and provide a generalization performance analysis. Experiments
on real-world datasets demonstrate that under the same privacy
guarantee, the proposed algorithms are superior to the state of the
art in terms of model accuracy and convergence rate.
KEYWORDS
differential privacy; distributed machine learning; ADMM; decen-
tralized optimization
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1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the development of machine learning creates many
emerging applications that can improve the quality of our life, such
as medical diagnosis, autonomous driving, face recognition, etc.
With the proliferation of mobile phones and Internet-of-things
devices, a vast amount of data have been generated at an ever-
increasing rate, which leads to significant computational complex-
ity for data collection and processes via a centralized machine
learning approach. Therefore, distributed machine learning plays
an increasingly important role in dealing with large scale machine
learning tasks. There are many research efforts on distributed train-
ing a large scale optimization problem, which mainly consist of
two types: (sub)gradient based methods, and Alternating Direction
Method of Multipliers (ADMM) based methods. As shown in [2],
the convergence of (sub)gradient based methods are usually slow,
which is O(1/√T ) under general convex objectives, while ADMM
based algorithms can achieve O(1/T ) convergence rate, where T is
the number of iterations. Therefore, ADMM has been widely used
in distributed machine learning [17, 22], and in this paper, we focus
on the distributed ADMM.
In the framework of distributed ADMM, data providers (agents)
collaboratively solve a learning problem, which can be decomposed
into several subproblems, via an interactive procedure of local
computation and message passing. However, the information ex-
changes during this process raise serious privacy concerns, and the
adversary can extract private information from the shared learn-
ing models via various inference attacks [16, 19]. To prevent such
privacy leakage, differential privacy (DP) [9] provides a de facto
standard of privacy definition for protecting data privacy, which
guarantees that the adversary with arbitrary background knowl-
edge cannot extract any sensitive information about the training
dataset.
Many pioneering works have studied how to effectively integrate
ADMM with DP, e.g., [5–7, 12, 23, 25, 26], which can be classified
into two categories in general. The first type of works is to add a
noisy term to perturb the objective function in each ADMM itera-
tion using an objective perturbation approach [3]. The second type
of works is to perturb the updates of original distributed ADMM
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algorithm via an output perturbation approach [3]. Specifically, as
an objective perturbation method, [23] proposed to inject noise to
the update of the dual variable to provide DP guarantee, while the
total privacy loss over the whole iterative process is not quanti-
fied. Further, [25, 26] proposed to perturb the penalty parameter
of ADMM and re-utilize the previous iteration’s results to save the
privacy loss. These methods also quantify the total privacy loss
over the entire process. Moreover, [12] perturbed the augmented
Lagrangian with time-varying Gaussian noise and considered a
centralized network structure to perform ADMM updates. As out-
put perturbation methods, [6, 7] proposed to perturb the primal
variables by Gaussian noise with linearly decaying Gaussian noise
to preserve DP and maintain the utility.
However, the guarantee of DP in the above works relies on the
premise that the optimality of each local problem can be perfectly at-
tained in each iteration during the whole training procedure, which
is seldom seen in practice. Further, the trained models from the
above works exhibit severe degradation in terms of the convergence
performance and model accuracy, compared to their non-private
versions.
In this paper, we propose (Improved) Plausible differentially
PrivateADMM based distributedmachine learning algorithm called
PP-ADMM and IPP-ADMM, respectively. Instead of requiring each
local problem to reach the optimality, PP-ADMM is able to release a
noisy approximate solution of the local optimization with Gaussian
noise related to the optimization accuracy, while preserving DP.
To further improve the utility, we propose an improved version
of PP-ADMM, i.e., IPP-ADMM, by exploiting the sparse vector tech-
nique (SVT) to check whether the current approximate solution has
enough difference from that of the previous iteration. Moreover, the
privacy analysis of our algorithms based on the zero-concentrated
DP (zCDP) yields a tight privacy loss bound. We analyze the gener-
alization performance of PP-ADMM. Our salient contributions are
summarized as follows.
• To release the shackles of “exact local optimal results" and
make ADMM based distributed machine learning achieve
DP and plausible, we propose a novel PP-ADMM method
by exploiting the inexact solution of the perturbed local
optimization over local agent’s private data during each
ADMM iteration, while preserving the data privacy.
• We further propose an improved version of PP-ADMM (IPP-
ADMM) by employing SVT to evaluate whether the current
approximate solution has a big enough difference from that
of the previous iteration. If the difference surpasses a pre-
defined threshold, the approximate solution with Gaussian
noise will be shared with neighbors; otherwise, the current
approximate solution will be discarded. By this way, the re-
dundant privacy loss accumulation and the transmissions
of “low quality” can be avoided during the ADMM iterative
process.
• To best track the privacy loss accumulation, we leverage
the serial and parallel composition theorems of the zCDP
to theoretically quantify and analyze the overall privacy
guarantees of the PP-ADMM and IPP-ADMM algorithms.
Moreover, we provide a generalization performance analysis
of PP-ADMM by measuring the number of data samples
required to achieve a certain criteria.
• Through extensive experiments on the real-world datasets,
we show the superior performance of the proposed algo-
rithms over the state-of-the-art differentially private ADMM
algorithms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates
the optimization problem, and describes preliminaries of ADMM
and differential privacy. Then, the plausible private robust ADMM
algorithm and its corresponding privacy and sample complexity
analysis are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we provide the IPP-
ADMM, an improved version of PP-ADMM, and the corresponding
privacy analysis. The experimental results on real-world datasets
are shown in Section 5. Finally, we draw conclusive remarks in
Section 6.
2 PROBLEM FORMULATION AND
PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, we consider a connected network contains N agents
with node set N = {1, · · · ,N }, and each agent i has a dataset
Di with Di = {(xni ,yni )}
|Di |
n=1 , where x
n
i ∈ X is a feature vector
and yni ∈ Y is a label. The communication among agents can be
represented by an undirected graphG = {N ,E }, where E denotes
the set of communication links between agents. Note that two
agents i and j can communicate with each other only when they
are neighbors, i.e., (i, j) ∈ E . We also denote the set of neighbors of
agent i asBi . The goal is to cooperatively train a classifier θ ∈ Rd
over the union of all local datasets in a decentralized fashion (i.e.,
no centralized controller) while keeping the privacy for each data
sample, which can be formulated as an Empirical Risk Minimization
(ERM) problem.
min
θ ∈Rd
N∑
i=1
1
|Di |
|Di |∑
n=1
L (yni θT xni ) + λˆR(θ ), (1)
whereL (·) : X × Y × Rd → R stands for a convex loss function
with |L ′(·)| ≤ 1 and 0 < L ′′(·) ≤ c1,R(θ ) : Rd → R is a differen-
tiable and 1-strongly convex regularizer to prevent overfitting, and
λˆ ≥ 0 refers to a regularizer parameter that controls the impact of
regularizer. We assume that each feature vector xni is normalized to∥xni ∥2 ≤ 1. Note that the formulations of classification in machine
learning like logistic regression, or support vector machines, can
also be fallen into the framework of ERM. In order to solve the ERM
problem (1) in a decentralized manner, we adopt the simple but
efficient optimization method, ADMM. We then in the following
subsection review some preliminaries about ADMM algorithm for
solving Problem (1).
2.1 ADMM
It is easy to see that the ERM problem (1) can be equivalently
reformulated as the following consensus form by introducing θi ,
that is, the local copy of common classifier θ at agent i .
min
{θi }, {ρi j }
∑N
i=1 fi (θi )
s.t. θi = ρi j , θ j = ρi j , i ∈ N , j ∈ Bi ,
(2)
where {ρi j |i ∈ N , j ∈ Bi } is a set of slack variables to enforce
all local copies are equal to each other, i.e., θ1 = θ2 = · · · ,=
θN , and fi (θi ) = 1|Di |
∑ |Di |
n=1 L (yni θTi xni ) + λˆN R(θi ). According to
Problem (2), each agent i can minimize local function fi (θi ) over
its own private dataset with respect to θi , under the consensus
constraints. In [25], ADMM is employed to optimize Problem (2) in a
decentralized fashion. By defining a dual variable λi for agent i , and
introducing the following notion,Lnon (θi ,Di ) = fi (θi )+(2λti )T θi+
η
∑
j ∈Bi | |
1
2 (θ
t
i +θ
t
j )−θi | |22 , ADMM then has the following iterative
updates in the (t + 1)-th iteration:
θ t+1i = argmin
θi
Lnon (θi ,Di ); (3)
λt+1i = λ
t
i +
η
2
∑
j ∈Bi
(θ t+1i − θ t+1j ), (4)
where η > 0 is a penalty parameter. Note that the reason why
the variable ρi j is not appeared in (3) and (4) is that it can be
expressed by using the primal variable θi , as shown in [15]. In the
iteration t + 1, each agent i ∈ N updates its local θ t+1i via (3) by
using its previous results θ ti and λ
t
i , and the shared local classifiers
θ tj from its neighbors j ∈ Bi . Next, agent i broadcasts θ t+1i to
all its neighboring agents. After obtaining all of its neighboring
computation results, each agent updates the dual variable λt+1i
through (4).
2.2 Differential Privacy
For the privacy-preserving data analysis, the standard privacy met-
ric, Differential privacy (DP) [9, 11], is proposed to measure the
privacy risk of each data sample in the dataset, and has already
been adopted in many machine learning domains [4, 8, 18, 20, 24].
Basically, under DP framework, privacy protection is guaranteed by
limiting the difference of the distribution of the output regardless
of the value change of any one sample in the dataset.
Definition 2.1 ((ϵ,δ )-DP [9]). A randomizedmechanismM satis-
fies (ϵ,δ )-DP if for any two neighboring datasets D and Dˆ differing
in at most one single data sample, and for any possible output
o ∈ Ranдe(M), we have Pr[M(D) = o] ≤ eϵPr[M(Dˆ) = o] + δ .
Here ϵ,δ are privacy loss parameters that indicate the strength
of the privacy protection from the mechanismM. The privacy pro-
tection is stronger if they are smaller. The above privacy definition
reduces to pure DP when δ = 0 and when δ > 0, it is referred to
as approximate DP. We can achieve pure and approximate DP by
utilizing two popular approaches called Laplace and GaussianMech-
anism, both of which share the same form M(D) = Mq (D) + u,
whereMq (D) is a query function over dataset D, and u is random
noise. We also denote two neighboring datasets D and Dˆ as D ∼ Dˆ,
and denote Lap(λ) as a zero-mean Laplace distribution with scale
parameter λ.
Definition 2.2 (Laplace Mechanism [9]). Given any function
Mq : D → Rd , the LaplaceMechanism is defined as:ML(D,q, ϵ) =
Mq (D) + u, where u is drawn from a Laplace distribution Lap(∆1ϵ )
with scale parameter proportional to the L1-sensitivity ofMq given
as ∆1 = supD∼Dˆ ∥Mq (D) − Mq (Dˆ)∥1. Laplace Mechanism pre-
servers ϵ-differential privacy.
Definition 2.3 (Gaussian Mechanism [9]). Given any func-
tion Mq : D → Rd , the Gaussian Mechanism is defined as:
MG (D,q, ϵ,δ ) = Mq (D) + u, where u is drawn from a Gaussian
distribution N(0,σ 2Id ) with σ ≥
√
2 ln(1.25/δ )∆2
ϵ , and ∆2 is the L2-
sensitivity of functionMq , i.e., ∆2 = supD∼Dˆ ∥Mq (D)−Mq (Dˆ)∥2.
Gaussian Mechanism provides (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy.
Next, we introduce a generalization of DP, which is called the
zero-concentrated DP (zCDP) [1] that uses the Rényi divergence be-
tweenM(D) andM(Dˆ), which can achieve a much tighter privacy
loss bound under multiple privacy mechanisms composition.
Definition 2.4 (ρ-zCDP [1]). We say that a randomized algo-
rithmM provides ρ-zCDP, if for all neighboring datasets D and
Dˆ and for all τ ∈ (1,∞), we have Dτ (M(D)∥M(Dˆ)) ≤ ρτ , where
Dτ (M(D)∥M(Dˆ)) is the τ -Rényi divergence 1 between the distri-
butionM(D) and the distributionM(Dˆ).
The following lemmas show that the Gaussian mechanism satis-
fies zCDP, the composition theorem of ρ-zCDP, and the relationship
among ρ-zCDP, ϵ-DP, and (ϵ,δ )-DP.
Lemma 2.5 ([1]). The Gaussian mechanism with noise N(0,σ 2)
satisfies ∆22/(2σ 2)-zCDP.
Lemma 2.6 (Serial Composition [1]). If randomized mecha-
nisms M1 : D → R1 and M2 : D → R2 obey ρ1-zCDP and
ρ2-zCDP, respectively. Then their composition defined asM ′′ : D →
R1 × R2 byM ′′ = (M1,M2) obeys (ρ1 + ρ2)-zCDP.
Lemma 2.7 (DP to zCDP conversion [1]). If a randomizedmech-
anismM provides ϵ-DP, thenM is 12ϵ2-zCDP. Moreover, forM to
satisfy (ϵ,δ )-DP, it suffices to satisfy ρ-zCDP with ρ = ϵ 24 ln (1/δ ) .
Lemma 2.8 (zCDP toDP conversion [1]). If a randomizedmech-
anismM obeys ρ-zCDP, thenM obeys (ρ + 2√ρ ln(1/δ ),δ )-DP for
all 0 < δ < 1.
2.3 Sparse Vector Technique
A powerful approach for achieving DP employs the sparse vec-
tor technique (SVT) [10], which takes a sequence of queries with
bounded sensitivity ∆ against a fixed sensitive dataset and outputs
a vector representing whether each answer to the query exceeds
a threshold or not. A unique advantage of SVT is that it can out-
put some query answer without paying additional privacy cost.
Specifically, as shown in [14], SVT has the following four steps.
(i), We first compute a noisy threshold γˆ by adding a threshold
noise Lap( ∆ϵ1 ) to the predefined threshold γ . (ii), We then utilize a
noise vi ∼ Lap( 2c∆ϵ2 ) to perturb each query qi . (iii), We compare
each noisy query answer qi (D) + νi with the noisy threshold γˆ and
respond whether it is higher (⊤) or lower (⊥) than the threshold.
(iv), This procedure continues until the number of ⊤’s in the output
meets the predefined bound c . According to [14], the SVT algo-
rithm satisfies the ϵ-DP with ϵ = ϵ1 + ϵ2. In order to analyze the
privacy guarantee of SVT under the zCDP framework, we utilize
1Definition can be found in [1]
the conversion result in Lemma 2.7. We can see that SVT satisfies
1
2ϵ
2-zCDP.
3 PLAUSIBLE PRIVATE ADMM
In this section, we will present our plausible differentially private
(PP-ADMM) by adding Gaussian noise related to the maximum
tolerable gradient norm of perturbed objective in each ADMM
iteration, which relaxes the requirement of exact optimal solution
as shown in [23, 25, 26], to provide differential privacy guarantee of
each training data sample during the iterative procedure. We also
adopt the privacy framework of zCDP to compute much tighter
privacy loss estimation of PP-ADMM. In addition, the generalization
performance guarantees of PP-ADMM is provided by measuring
the number of data samples at each agent to achieve a specific
criteria.
Specifically, in each iteration, we perturb the subproblem (3)
with the objective perturbation method the same as used in previ-
ous studies [23, 25, 26], where a random linear vector (bi1)T θi is
injected to the objective function, and bi1 is a random vector drawn
from a zero mean Gaussian distribution N(0,σ 2i1Id ). Consequently
the objective function (3) used to update the primal variable θ t+1i
becomes the following modified function:
Lper (θi ,Di ) = fi (θi ) + (2λti + bi1)T θi + η
∑
j ∈Bi
| | 12 (θ
t
i + θ
t
j ) − θi | |22
(5)
where fi (θi ) = 1|Di |
∑ |Di |
n=1 L (yni θTi xni ) + λˆN R(θi ). In order to en-
sure DP guarantee, as pointed out in [23, 25, 26], each agent i ∈ N
needs to find the optimal solution θ˜ t+1i of the perturbed objective
function Lper (θi ,Di ), i.e.,
θ˜ t+1i = argmin
θi
Lper (θi ,Di ). (6)
However, the subproblem (6) may not be easy to solve and obtain an
optimal solution in a finite time. For instance, if we choose logistic
regression as loss function, the subproblem (6) cannot yield an ana-
lytical solution due to the complicated form of logistic regression.
Especially when the problem dimension or the number of training
samples is large, obtaining optimal solution might not be feasible
in every iteration.
Thus, we consider obtaining the approximate solution of per-
turbed objective function Lper (θi ,Di ) to provide privacy guaran-
tees when the optimal solution is not attainable.
Specifically, we approximately solve the perturbed problem until
the norm of gradient of Lper is within a pre-defined threshold β .
However, due to the limitations of objective perturbation method
[3], releasing this inexact solution leads to the failure of providing
DP guarantee.We thus perturb the approximated solution θˆ t+1i with
another random noise bi2 from Gaussian distribution N(0,σ 2i2Id ),
to "fuzz" the difference between θˆ t+1i and the optimal solution
θ˜ t+1i . Note that the noise variance σ
2
i2 has the parameter β about
the maximum tolerable gradient norm, which leads to a trade-off
between the gradient norm bound and the difficulty of obtaining
an approximate solution within the norm bound.
Algorithm 1 Plausible Private ADMM
1: Input: datasets {Di }Ni=1; initial variables θ0i ∈ Rd and λ0i = 0d ;
step size η; privacy parameters, ϵi1, δi1, ϵi3, ρi2; Optimizer
O(·, ·) : F ×β → Rd (F is the class of objectives, and β is the
optimization accuracy, i.e., the gradient norm of objectives);
gradient norm threshold β ∈ β .
2: Set ϵi1, δi1, ϵi3, ρi2 > 0 such that ϵi1 > ϵi3.
3: Set regularizer parameter λˆ ≥ max
i
2.8Nc1
(ϵi1−ϵi3) |Di | .
4: for t = 0, . . . ,T − 1 do
5: for i = 1, . . . ,N do
6: Generate noise bi1 ∼ N(0,σ 2i1Id ) with σi1 =
2
√
2 ln (1.25/δi1)/(|Di |ϵi3).
7: Construct the perturbed objective function
Lper (θi ,Di ) according to (5).
8: Compute an approximate solution θˆ t+1i : θˆ
t+1
i =
O(Lper (θi ,Di ), β).
9: Generate noise bi2 ∼ N(0,σ 2i2Id ) with σi2 =
β/[√2ρi2( λˆN + 2η |Bi |)].
10: Perturb θˆ t+1i : θ
t+1
i = θˆ
t+1
i + bi2.
11: end for
12: for i = 1, . . . ,N do
13: Broadcast θ t+1i to all neighbors j ∈ Bi .
14: end for
15: for i = 1, . . . ,N do
16: Update local dual variables λt+1i from λ
t+1
i = λ
t
i +
η
2
∑
j ∈Bi
(θ t+1i − θ t+1j ).
17: end for
18: end for
The key steps of PP-ADMM algorithm are summarized in Algo-
rithm 1. The privacy parameters (ϵi1,δi1) are used to perturb the
objective function while the parameter ρi2 being used to perturb
the approximate solution. Moreover, the parameter ϵi3, a portion
of ϵi1, is used to scale the noise injected to the objective func-
tion, and the remaining privacy budget (ϵi1 − ϵi3) is allocated to
setting the regularizer parameter. Notice that we also define an
Optimizer O(·, ·) : F × β → Rd , where F is the class of objec-
tives, and β is the optimization accuracy, i.e., the gradient norm
of objectives. Each agent i then constructs the perturbed function
Lper (θi ,Di ) with a Gaussian random vector bi1 and finds an in-
exact solution θˆ t+1i where the norm of gradient is lower than β ,
i.e., θˆ t+1i = O(Lper (θi ,Di ), β). After that each agent i generates
a random Gaussian noise bi2 and transmits θ t+1i = θˆi + bi2 to
its neighbors j ∈ Bi . Finally, each agent updates the local dual
variables λt+1i via λ
t+1
i = λ
t
i +
η
2
∑
j ∈Bi
(θ t+1i − θ t+1j ).
3.1 Privacy Analysis
Here, we provide the privacy guarantee of PP-ADMM (Algorithm
1) in the following two theorems. Due to the limited space, we only
provide a proof idea of Theorem 3.1, and the detailed proof can be
found in Appendix.
Theorem 3.1. The PP-ADMM in Algorithm 1 satisfies ρi -zCDP for
each agent i with ρi = T (ρi1 + ρi2), where ρi1 = ϵ2i1/(4 ln (1/δi1)),
and ρi2 > 0 is the privacy budget for perturbing the approximate
solution.
Proof Sketch. For achieving ρi -zCDP for each agent i at t + 1
iteration in Algorithm 1, we first divide the output of t + 1 iteration
into two parts. The first part is to obtain the optimal solution θ˜ t+1i
of the perturbed objective function Lper (θi ,Di ), and the second
part is to obtain the approximate solution with Gaussian noise θ t+1i .
We then show obtaining the optimal solution θ˜ t+1i provides ρi1-
zCDP with ρi1 = ϵ2i1/(4 ln (1/δi1)) for the first part, and releasing
an approximate solution in the second part is ρi2-zCDP. By using
the composition of zCDP in Lemma 2.6, we can get releasing the
perturbed primal variable θ t+1i at t +1 iteration provides (ρi1+ρi2)-
zCDP. ConsideringT iterations, the total privacy loss for each agent
i is bounded by ρi = T (ρi1 + ρi2). □
We then give the following parallel composition theorem of ρ-
zCDP to provides a together characterization of total privacy loss
for distributed algorithms.
Lemma 3.2 (Parallel Composition [21]). Suppose that a mecha-
nismM consists of a sequence ofk adaptivemechanismM1, · · · ,Mk
where eachMi :∏i−1j=1 Rj ×D → Ri andMi satisfies ρi -zCDP. Let
D1,D2, · · · ,Dk be the result of a randomized partition of the input
domainD. The mechanismM(D) = (M1(D∩D1), · · · ,Mk (D∩Dk ))
satisfies (max
i
ρi )-zCDP.
Based on Lemma 3.2, we can directly obtain the total privacy
loss of PP-ADMM given as follows.
Theorem 3.3. The PP-ADMM in Algorithm 1 satisfies ρ-zCDP
with ρ = max
i
ρi and satisfies (ϵ,δ )-DP with ϵ = ρ + 2
√
ρ ln (1/δ ).
3.2 Sample Complexity Analysis
We next measure the generalization performance of PP-ADMM by
focusing on the ERM problem given in Section 2. We also assume
that data samples of each agent i are drawn from a data distribution
P . The expected loss of classifier θ ti at iteration t is defined as
L(θ ti ) = E(x,y)∼P
(
L (y(θ ti )T x)
)
.
Following the similar analysis in [3, 23], we first introduce a refer-
ence classifier θr ef with expected loss L(θr ef ), and we then mea-
sure the generalization performance using the number of samples
Di required at each agent to achieve L(θ ti ) ≤ L(θr ef )+aacc , where
aacc is the generalization error.
3.2.1 PP-ADMMwithout Noise. Here, we consider the learning per-
formance at all iterations rather than only the final output. Let the
intermediate updated classifier θˆ t+1i,non at iteration t + 1 be θˆ
t+1
i,non =
O(Lnon (θi ,Di ), β). Note that {θˆ t+1i,non } is a sequence of non-private
classifier without adding perturbations. Let θ∗ = argmin
θi
fi (θi ,Di )
be the optimal output of PP-ADMM without Noise. The sequence
{θˆ t+1i,non } is bounded and θˆ t+1i,non converges to θ∗ as t → ∞. There-
fore, there exists a constant ∆t+1i,non at iteration t + 1 such that
L(θˆ t+1i,non ) ≤ L(θ∗)+∆t+1i,non . We then have the following result, and
the detailed proof can be found in supplemental material.
Theorem 3.4. Consider a regularized ERM problem withR(θ ) =
1
2 ∥θ ∥22 , and let θr ef be the reference classifier for all agents and
{θˆ t+1i,non } be a sequence of outputs of PP-ADMM without adding noise.
If the number of samples at agent i satisfies,
|Di | ≥ V maxt {
log (1/ξ )
(aacc−∆t+1i,non )2
2∥θr ef ∥22
− (1 + a)β
}
for some constant V , then θˆ t+1i,non satisfies
Pr
[
L(θˆ t+1i,non ) ≤ L(θr ef ) + aacc
]
≥ 1 − ξ
with aacc ≥ ∆t+1i,non .
Remark 1. As we can see from Theorem 3.4, the number of data
samples |Di | relies on the l2-norm of reference classifier ∥θr ef ∥22 and
the parameter β that bounds the optimization accuracy of the non-
private intermediate classifier. The results demonstrate that if |Di |
satisfies |Di | ≥ V maxt { log (1/ξ )(aacc −∆t+1i,non )2
2∥θr ef ∥22
−(1+a)β
}, each agent’s non-
private intermediate classifier will have an additional error less than
aacc compared to any classifier with ∥θr ef ∥22 . Moreover, if β = 0,
the result reduces to |Di | ≥ V maxt { 2∥θr ef ∥
2
2 log (1/ξ )
(aacc−∆t+1i,non )2
}, the same as
given in [23], which shows that the lower optimization accuracy of
the non-private intermediate classifier, the more samples required to
achieve the same accuracy.
3.2.2 PP-ADMM. We then show the sample complexity of the PP-
ADMM algorithm. Similar to the analysis in PP-ADMM without
noise, we also consider bounding the generalization error of the in-
termediate classifier θ t+1i of each agent i at all iterations. In order to
compare the private classifier θ t+1i with a reference classifier θr ef ,
we follow the same strategy used in [23]. We define a new optimiza-
tion function f newi (θi ,Di ) = fi (θi ,Di ) + bi1T θi and then solving
PP-ADMM algorithm is equivalent to solving a new optimization
problem, where each agent i’s performs local minimization to get
θ t+1i = O(f newi (θi ,Di ), β) + bi2. The sequence of outputs {θ t+1i }
is bounded and θ t+1i converges to a fixed point θ
∗
new as t → ∞.
Thus, there exists a constant ∆t+1i,new at t + 1 iteration, such that
L(θ t+1i ) ≤ L(θ∗new ) + ∆t+1i,new . We then give the following result,
and the detailed proof can be found in supplemental material.
Theorem 3.5. Consider a regularized ERM problem withR(θ ) =
1
2 ∥θ ∥22 , and letθr ef be the reference classifier for all agents and {θ t+1i }
be a sequence of outputs of PP-ADMM. If the number of samples at
agent i satisfies, for some constant V ,
|Di | ≥ V maxt {
log (1/ξ )
(aacc−∆t+1i,new )2
2∥θr ef ∥22
− (1 + a)(β +H )
}
withH =
σi2(aacc−∆t+1i,new )
√
2d log 1ξ
∥θr ef ∥22
+ 2σ 2i1d log
1
ξ , then θˆ
t+1
i,new sat-
isfies
Pr
[
L(θ t+1i ) ≤ L(θr ef ) + aacc
] ≥ 1 − 3ξ
with aacc ≥ ∆t+1i,new .
Remark 2. Compared to Theorem 3.4, we can see that in Theorem
3.5, the privacy constraints impose an additional termH withH
= σi2(aacc − ∆t+1i,new )
√
2d log 1ξ /∥θr ef ∥22+2σ 2i1d log 1ξ . If both noise
variancesσi1 andσi2 are equal to zero, the number of required samples
|Di | will reduce to the same result shown in Theorem 3.4. Moreover,
the additional termH demonstrates that the higher dimension of
features, the more added noise to achieve the same accuracy requires
more data samples.
4 IMPROVED PLAUSIBLE PRIVATE ADMM
In this section, we present an improved version of PP-ADMM algo-
rithm called Improved Plausible Private ADMM (IPP-ADMM) by
leveraging sparse vector technique (SVT) to improve the perfor-
mance and reduce the communication cost of PP-ADMM. Compared
with current differentially private ADMM algorithms [23, 25, 26],
although the proposed PP-ADMM algorithm can ensure DP guar-
antee without requiring the optimal solution during each ADMM
iteration, the primal variable is updated using the local data in
every iteration and frequently broadcasted to neighboring agents,
which leads to the privacy loss unavoidably accumulating over the
iterations, and compromise the accuracy during the whole training
procedure.
Hence, we adopt SVT that can output some local computational
results without paying any privacy budget, to check whether cur-
rent approximate solution has a big enough difference from that of
previous iteration,
where the difference is quantified by a quality function, fi (θ ti ) −
fi (θˆ t+1i ), based on the change of the values of local function over
the primal variable from previous iteration and current approximate
solution. If a sufficient level of difference α is achieved, each agent
transmits the current approximate solution with Gaussian noise
to its neighbors. Intuitively, if the difference between the current
approximate solution θˆ t+1i and the previously transmitted θ
t
i is
small, then using either one does not help the convergence of the
iterative process, which leads to reducing the communication cost.
However, one difficulty in using SVT is that there is no known
priori bound on query (i.e., the quality function) fi (θ ti ) − fi (θˆi ).
To bound the sensitivity of fi (θ ti ) − fi (θˆi ), we apply the clipping
method to clipping the loss functionL (·). Given a fixed clipping
threshold Closs , we compute the value of loss function L (·) on
each local data sample, clip the values at most Closs , and compute
the value of fi (θ ti ) − fi (θˆi ) based on the clipped values. Note that
we denote this loss function clipping procedure as Clip.
The complete procedure of IPP-ADMM algorithm for a single
agent is shown in Algorithm 2. The privacy parameters ϵ1 and
ϵ2 are allocated to perturb the quality function and threshold α ,
respectively. In each iteration, each agent i first constructs the
perturbed function Lper (θi ,Di ) with a Gaussian random vector
bi1 and finds an inexact solution θˆ t+1i , where the norm of gradient
is lower than β , i.e., θˆ t+1i = O(Lper (θi ,Di ), β). Then each agent
apply the clipping method Clip to clip the quality function fi (θ ti )−
fi (θˆ t+1i ) with a clipping threshold Closs to limit the sensitivity of
quality function. Further, each agent uses SVT to check whether
Algorithm 2 Improved Plausible Private ADMM Run by Agent i
1: Input: dataset Di ; initial variables θ0i ∈ Rd and λ0i = 0d ;
threshold, α ; Maximum number of primal variables that can
be broadcasted, c; loss function clipping threshold Closs ; step
size η; privacy parameters, ϵi1, δi1, ϵi3, ρi2, ϵ1, ϵ2; Optimizer
O(·, ·) : F ×β → Rd (F is the class of objectives, and β is the
optimization accuracy, i.e., the gradient norm of objectives);
gradient norm threshold β ∈ β .
2: Set ϵi1, δi1, ϵi3, ρi2, ϵ1, ϵ2 > 0 such that ϵi1 > ϵi3.
3: Set regularizer parameter λˆ ≥ max
i
2.8Nc1
(ϵi1−ϵi3) |Di | .
4: counti = 0.
5: for t = 0, . . . ,T − 1 do
6: Generate noise bi1 ∼ N(0,σ 2i1Id ) with σi1 =
2
√
2 ln (1.25/δi1)/(|Di |ϵi1).
7: Construct the perturbed objective function Lper (θi ,Di )
according to (5).
8: Compute an approximate solution θˆ t+1i : θˆ
t+1
i =
O(Lper (θi ,Di ), β).
9: if Clip
[
fi (θ ti ) − fi (θˆ t+1i )
]
+ Lap(4cCloss
ϵ2
) ≥ α +
Lap(2cCloss
ϵ1
) then
10: counti = counti + 1, Abort if counti > c.
11: Generate noise bi2 ∼ N(0,σ 2i2Id ) with σi2 =
β/[√2ρi2( λˆN + 2η |Bi |)].
12: Perturb θˆ t+1i : θ
t+1
i = θˆ
t+1
i + bi2.
13: Broadcast θ t+1i to all neighbors j ∈ Bi .
14: else
15: Let θ t+1i = θ
t
i .
16: end if
17: if θ t+1j is not received from neighbor j ∈ Bi then
18: Replace θ t+1j with θ
t
j .
19: else
20: Keep θ t+1j .
21: end if
22: Update local dual variables λt+1i from λ
t+1
i = λ
t
i +
η
2
∑
j ∈Bi
(θ t+1i − θ t+1j ).
23: end for
the difference between the approximate solution θˆ t+1i and θ
t
i is
below a noisy threshold αˆ = α + Lap( 2cClossϵ1 ) via a noisy quality
function, Clip
[
fi (θ ti ) − fi (θˆ t+1i )
]
+Lap( 4cClossϵ2 ). If yes, then agent
i does not transmit any computational results and let θ t+1i = θ
t
i ;
otherwise, each agent i generates a random noise bi2 ∼ N(0,σ 2i2Id )
with σi2 = β/√2ρi2( λˆN + 2η |Bi |), and transmits θ t+1i = θˆ t+1i + bi2
to its neighbors. Moreover, each agent maintains a counter count i
to bound the total number of broadcasts of primal variables during
the whole interactive process. If a predefined transmission number
c(c ≤ T ) is exceeded, agent i stops transmitting anything even
when the condition in Line 7 is satisfied. Hence, if agent i does
not receive θ t+1j from any neighbor j ∈ Bi , then lets θ t+1j = θ tj .
Finally, each agent updates the local dual variables λt+1i via λ
t+1
i =
λti +
η
2
∑
j ∈Bi
(θ t+1i − θ t+1j ).
4.1 Privacy Analysis
We provide the privacy guarantee of IPP-ADMM (Algorithm 2) in
following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. The IPP-ADMM in Algorithm 2 satisfies ρ ′i -zCDP
for each agent i with ρ ′i = ρ
′
1 + c(ρi1 + ρi2), where ρ ′1 = (ϵ1+ϵ2)
2
2 ,
ρi1 = ϵ2i1/(4 ln (1/δi1)), ρi2 > 0 is the privacy budget for perturbing
the approximate solution, and c (c < T ) is the maximum number of
primal variables that can be broadcasted. Moreover, the total privacy
guarantee of IPP-ADMM is ρ ′-zCDP with ρ ′ = max
i
ρ ′i .
Proof. For achieving ρ ′i -zCDP for each agent i in Algorithm
2, we first divide the procedure of the algorithm into two parts.
The first part is using SVT to compare the noisy threshold and
the perturbed query answer (i.e., the value of quality function) to
check the quality of the approximate solution obtained in Step 7
of the Algorithm 1. The second part is to share the approximate
solution with Gaussian noise, whose value is above the threshold.
We prove that DP mechanism used in the first part provides ρ ′1-
zCDP (shown in Lemma 4.3). Moreover, at each iteration, the privacy
budget spending on releasing an approximate solution in the second
part is (ρi1 + ρi2)-zCDP (shown in Theorem 3.1). Then, using the
composition of zCDP in Lemma 2.6, we obtain the privacy guarantee
of IPP-ADMM for each agent i is ρi = ρ1+c(ρi1+ρi2) by considering
c times of broadcasting primal variables. Lastly, we get a total
privacy guarantee of IPP-ADMM, i.e., ρ ′-zCDP with ρ ′ = max
i
ρ ′i
by adopting the parallel composition in Lemma 3.2. □
Before presenting the privacy guarantee of the first part, i.e.,
compare the noisy threshold and the perturbed query answer to
check the quality of the approximate solution, we first give the
sensitivity of the clipped quality function as follows.
Lemma 4.2. Given a clipping threshold Closs of the loss function
L (·), the sensitivity of quality function fi (θ ti ) − fi (θˆ t+1i ) is at most
2Closs , where fi (θi ) = 1|Di |
∑ |Di |
n=1 L (yni θTi xni ) + λˆN R(θi ).
Proof. Fix a pair of adjacent datasets Di and Dˆi and we also
assume that only the first data point in Di and Dˆi are different, i.e.,
(x1i ,y1i ) and (xˆ1i , yˆ1i ). According to the definition of L1-sensitivity,
we have
∆f = ∥ fi (θ ti ,Di ) − fi (θˆ t+1i ,Di ) − fi (θ ti , Dˆi ) + fi (θˆ t+1i , Dˆi )∥1
= ∥L (y1i (θ ti )T x1i ) −L (yˆ1i (θ ti )T xˆ1i )
− (L (y1i (θ t+1i )T x1i ) −L (yˆ1i (θ t+1i )T xˆ1i ))∥1
≤ ∥L (y1i (θ ti )T x1i ) −L (yˆ1i (θ ti )T xˆ1i )∥1
+ ∥L (y1i (θ t+1i )T x1i ) −L (yˆ1i (θ t+1i )T xˆ1i )∥1
≤ 2Closs . □
Then we show the privacy guarantee of the first part in the
following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. Given the maximum number of primal variables that
we can broadcast, c, using SVT to check whether the approximate
solution is above the threshold α provides ρ1-zCDP with ρ1 =
(ϵ1+ϵ2)2
2 .
Proof. During the whole training process, each agent will re-
ceive a stream of queries (i.e., a stream of clipped quality functions
Clip
[
fi (θ ti ) − fi (θˆ t+1i )
]
) with sensitivity 2Closs and compare them
with a noisy threshold α + Lap( 2cClossϵ1 ). According to Theorem 1
in [14], this procedure satisfies (ϵ1 + ϵ2)-DP and by Lemma 2.7, it
also satisfies (ϵ1+ϵ2)
2
2 -zCDP. □
5 NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
Datasets. Experiments are performed on three benchmark datasets2:
Adult, US, and Brazil. Adult has 48,842 data samples and 41 features,
and the label is to predict whether an annual income is more than
$50k or not. US has 40,000 records and 58 features, and the label
is to predict whether the annual income of an individual is more
than $25k. BR has 38,000 samples and 53 features, and the goal is to
predict whether the monthly income of an individual is more than
$300.
Data preprocessing.We consider the same preprocessing pro-
cedure as the method used in [25]. We first normalize each attribute
so that the maximum attribute value is 1, and normalize each sam-
ple so its L2-norm at most 1. As for the label column, we also map it
to {−1, 1}. In each simulation, we randomly sample 35,000 records
for training and divide them into N parties, and thus each party
includes 35000/N data samples (i.e., |Di | = 35000/N ). We denote
the rest of the data records as testing data.
Baselines.We compare our proposed algorithms against four
baseline algorithms: (i) DVP [23], is a dual variable perturbation
method, where the dual variable of each agent at each ADMM
iteration is perturbed by Gamma noise. (ii) M-ADMM [25], is a
penalty perturbation approach, where each agent’s penalty variable
is perturbed by Gamma noise at each ADMM iteration. (iii) R-
ADMM [26], is based on the penalty approach and the re-utilization
of previous iteration’s results to save the privacy loss. (iv) Non-
private (decentralized ADMM without adding noise). Note that the
privacy guarantees of DVP, M-ADMM, and R-ADMM hold only
when the optimal solution of the perturbed subproblem is obtained
in each iteration. In order to have a fair comparison, we adopt
the Newton solver to obtain the optimal solution in each iteration.
Notice that we also provide sharpened and tight privacy loss of
above private ADMM algorithms under the privacy framework of
zCDP.
Setup.Weadopt logistic lossL (yni θTi xni ) = log(1+exp(−yni θTi xni ))
as loss function, and the derivativeL ′(·) is bounded with |L ′(·)| ≤
1 and c1-Lipschitz with c1 = 1/4. We also letR(θi ) = 12 ∥θi ∥22 . We
evaluate the accuracy by classification error rate over the testing
set, defined as Error rate = Number of incorrect predict ionsTotal number of predict ions made and
the convergence of algorithms by the average loss over the training
samples, given by Lt = 1N
∑N
i=1
1
|Di |
∑ |Di |
n=1 L (yni (θ ti )T xni ). We
also report the mean and standard deviation of the average loss.
The smaller the average loss, the higher accuracy.
2http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Adult, http://international.ipums.org
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Figure 1: Effects of privacy budget splitting
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Figure 2: Effects of optimization accuracy β
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Figure 3: Effects of clipping threshold Closs
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Figure 4: Effects of α
Parameter settings.We consider a randomly generated undi-
rectedly network with N = 5 agents and we fix the step size η = 0.5
and the total iteration number T = 30. We also consider the maxi-
mum number of primal variables that can be shared, c = 15. More-
over, to maximize the utility of SVT, we follow the ratio between
ϵ1 and ϵ2 in [14], i.e., ϵ1 : ϵ2 = 1 : (2c) 23 . In all experiments, we set
δ = 10−4, and ϵ = {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 10}.
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Figure 5: Trade-off between classification error rate and pri-
vacy on Adult dataset
Impacts of parameters. In this set of experiments on the Adult
dataset, we present the effects of privacy budgets splitting and op-
timization accuracy (i.e., gradient norm threshold) β on the perfor-
mance of PP-ADMM, and the loss clipping threshold Closs and the
quality function significance threshold α on the performance of
IPP-ADMM. Specifically, we adjust different parameter settings sep-
arately, while keeping the rest constant to represent their impacts
on training and testing accuracy.
For the privacy budgets splitting of PP-ADMM, we first convert
the overall privacy budget parameters (ϵ,δ ) to ρtotal = ϵ
2
4 ln(1/δ ) .
We set ρi1 = ρtotalT · (1 − splits) and ρi2 =
ρtotal
T · splits , where
splits denotes the fraction of ρtotal allocated to ρi2. By tuning
splits , we can find the good trade-off between the privacy budget for
perturbing the objective and perturbing the approximate solution.
In addition, we compute ϵi1 = ρi1+2
√
ρi1 ln(1/δi1)with δi1 = 10−4,
and set ϵi3 = 0.99 · ϵi1 to dedicate most of the budget to reduce
the amount of noise for perturbing the objective and increase the
influence of regularization. Figure 1 shows the effects of privacy
budget splitting on the performance of PP-ADMM by setting β =
10−6. As splits decreases, i.e., allocating less privacy budgets for
perturbing the approximate solution, it yields better training and
testing accuracy. Thus, we set splits = 0.001 to achieve a good trade-
off between amount of noise added to the objective and approximate
solution.
Figure 2 shows how classification accuracy changes with varying
values of β and fixing splits = 0.001. The parameter β controls
the optimization accuracy of each iteration of PP-ADMM training
process and the amount of noise for perturbing the approximate
solution. As it can be observed from the figure, due to randomness
of objective introduced by the random noise, when β is too small,
solving the noisy objective perfectly in each iteration may not help
the final performance. Conversely, when β is too large, large amount
of noise is added to perturb the approximate solution, which also
leads to performance degradation. In our experiments, we thus fix
β = 10−3.5 that achieves lowest training/testing error rate.
The IPP-ADMM algorithm has two threshold parameters, Closs
and α . These two parameters are used to bound the sensitivity of
the quality function, and the value of quality function, respectively.
If the clipping thresholdCloss is set to a small value, it significantly
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Figure 6: Convergence comparisons on Adult dataset (left: ϵ = 1, middle: ϵ = 2, right: ϵ = 10)
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Figure 7: Classification error rate comparisons on Brazil and US datasets.
reduces the sensitivity but at the same time it leads much informa-
tion loss in the estimation of quality function. On the other hand, if
Closs is large, the sensitivity becomes large that results in adding
too much noise to the estimation. Thus, too large or small values of
Closs have a negative effect on employing SVT to check whether
the current approximate solution has a big enough difference from
that of previous iteration. As we can see from Figure 3, Closs = 2
achieves a good trade-off between high information loss and large
sensitivity. In Figure 4, we fix the the clipping threshold Closs = 2
and vary α from 10−3 to 10 to see the effect of α on the performance.
Although large value of α may potentially reduce the releasing of
low quality approximate solution and reduce the communication
cost, we observe that it also leads the learning performance degrada-
tion. We then choose α = 10−3 in our experiments, which achieves
the lowest testing/training error rate.
Performance comparisons.We also present the trade-off be-
tween classification error rate and privacy cost in Figure 5, where
we measured the privacy costs of all algorithms to obtain some
specified testing error rates. Figure 5 illustrates that both of our
methods have consistently lower privacy cost than those baselines
algorithms. Compared with PP-ADMM, IPP-ADMM further saves
more privacy cost due to limiting the number of releasing low-
quality computational results. Additionally, we also inspect the
convergence performance (i.e., average loss) of different algorithms
under the same budgets, as shown in Fig. 6. We can observe that
when budget ϵ decreases from 10 to 1, the average loss values of
baseline algorithms increase, which matches the simulation results
shown in [7, 25, 26]. Although we also analyze the baseline algo-
rithms using zCDP to provide tight privacy bound, using Gaussian
noise instead of Gamma noise might be more beneficial to the per-
formance, which usually has at least
√
d times improvement of the
empirical risk bound [13], where d is the dimension of training
model. And our proposed algorithms continues to outperform the
baseline algorithms significantly.
Figure 7 compares the accuracy (classification error rate) of dif-
ferent algorithms on Brazil and US. The noise parameter of all al-
gorithms are chosen respectively so that they can achieve the same
total privacy loss. As expected, the lower privacy budget, the higher
classification error rate. As it was observed in the experiments, our
proposed algorithms get close to the best achievable classification
error rate for a wide range of total privacy loss considered in the
experiments.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have developed (Improved) plausible differen-
tially private ADMM algorithm, PP-ADMM and IPP-ADMM. In
PP-ADMM, in order to release the shackles of the exact optimal
solution during each ADMM iteration to ensure differential pri-
vacy, we consider outputting a noisy approximate solution for the
perturbed objective. To further improve the utility of PP-ADMM,
we have adopted SVT in IPP-ADMM to check whether the current
approximate solution has a big enough difference from that of pre-
vious iteration. Moreover, we have analyzed privacy loss under
the framework of zCDP and generalization performance guarantee.
Finally, through the experiments on real-world datasets, we have
demonstrated that the proposed algorithms outperform other differ-
entially private ADMM based algorithms while providing the same
privacy guarantee. In future work, we plan to extend our privacy
analysis to non-convex loss function and apply our methods to deep
learning framework. Another research direction is to study the idea
of using SVT to other distributed (federated) deep learning frame-
work to save the privacy budget and reduce the communication
cost.
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